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Ladies and Gentlemen,1 
 
I believe that we are mainly here to talk, which is to say that I should not speak at all; but after all, I 
suppose that in order for you to be able to exercise your right to have a say, which will be a right to 
examine and a right to critique, it is necessary that I expose myself to your blows. And consequently, I am 
going to present some slightly untidy remarks on the basis of which I hope you yourselves will have an 
occasion to express your opinions.  
The subject that I have chosen, at bottom, insofar as I did not know beforehand who I was 
speaking to – luckily, as it happens, because if I had known in front of whom I would be speaking, I 
believe that I would have given up speaking altogether. For on the one hand, the audience is comprised of 
extremely intimidating people who are my colleagues and who, consequently, know more than me. And 
on the other hand, there are many students who know me already and who have already seen my act. 
Consequently, all this is evidently a little intimidating and embarrassing for me. Thus, not knowing too 
much about who I had to speak in front of, I thought that I could speak about the problem of the relations 
between structuralism and literary analysis. 
Of course, I have no competence to speak about this problem of the relations between 
structuralism and literary analysis (as you can well imagine). In fact, if I have chosen this subject, it is 
largely because it is currently the nest, the site of a number of ambiguities. You all know, from having 
heard echoes at least, the debate about what is called “la nouvelle critique.” Hiding beneath this debate, I 
believe, are a number of concepts that are, ultimately, rather ill-defined. And it is with a search for 
definitions in mind that I would like to orient what must be the crux of this meeting, which is to say, the 
earlier debate.  
In general, I believe that we could say this. To all appearances, this discussion which has been 
dragging on for several years now not only in France, but in other countries, the impression is that it 
opposes a number of things and people, that it opposes a critique of, say, a scientific type to a critique of, 
say, an impressionistic type. We also have the impression that it opposes the supporters of content and 
meaning to the supporters of pure form. We have the impression, too, that this is a debate which opposes 
historians to those who are only interested in the system and the synchrony of works. We have the 
impression that it is, after all, also a matter of a conflict of persons or even of social groups, since there is, 
on the one side, the supporters of the old and outdated French University and then, on the other, the 
supporters, well, of a sort of intellectual renewal which would necessarily be external to the university. 
I am not sure that this manner of characterizing the debate is absolutely accurate. It is not true that 
the most reactionary in this debate of la nouvelle critique are necessarily within the university. The 
university, which does not always have many reasons to be proud of itself, can boast of not counting 
among its members a number of people who are the supporters of precisely this old-style critique. Neither 
is it true that analyses like those of Jean-Pierre Richard2 entirely ignore the meaning of a work in order to 
speak only of its content. It is not true that the present tendencies of literary analysis refuse history in 
favour of pure system and synchrony. Therefore I do not believe that all these qualifiers and all these 
determinations allow us to situate the debate correctly. 
To try to outline it better, I would like to introduce a notion which is completely familiar now and 
which, at first glance, should actually bring with it far more difficulties than it can solve: this is the notion 
of structuralism. In general, we can say that the debate currently turns upon the possibility, upon the right, 
                                                 
1 Some months after the publication of Les mots et les choses (1966), Foucault obtained a leave [détachement] from 
the University of Clermont-Ferrand to go teach philosophy at the University of Tunis. He moved to Sidi Bou Saïd in 
the autumn of 1966 and he would not leave Tunisia until two years later, in October 1968. The conference 
“Structuralism and Literary Analysis” was held at Club Tahar Haddad, in Tunis, on February 4, 1967. The present 
transcription was made from the recording preserved in the Bancroft Library at the University of California, 
Berkeley (Reel 81 – A, B and C). 
2 See J.-P. Richard, L’univers imaginaire de Mallarmé (Paris, 1961). See also Foucault’s review, “Le Mallarmé de 
J.-P. Richard,” Annales (1964): 996-1004.   
upon the fruitfulness of a method we call the “structuralist” method. Yet what is structuralism? It is 
extremely difficult to define it when we consider that, after all, under this word we designate analyses, 
methods, works, and individuals as different, for example, as the history of religions as done by Dumézil,3 
the analysis of mythologies by Lévi-Strauss,4 the analysis of the tragedies of Racine by Barthes,5 the 
analysis as well of literary works as it is currently done in America with Northrop Frye,6 the analyses of 
folktales that Russians like Propp have done,7 the analyses of philosophical systems like those of 
Guéroult.8 All this is placed under the structuralist label. It is thus perhaps slightly dangerous to wish to 
illuminate all these problems with a notion so confused.  
Yet it is on this structuralism that I would like to pause for a little while. Structuralism, it is 
understood, is not a philosophy. It is not a philosophy, and structuralism can be linked to philosophies 
that are completely different from one another. Lévi-Strauss has explicitly linked his structural method to 
a philosophy, say, of the materialist type. Someone like Guéroult, for example, has, on the contrary, 
linked his own method of structuralist analysis to what we can roughly call an idealist philosophy. 
Someone like Althusser, for example, explicitly uses the concepts of structural analysis within a 
philosophy which is an explicitly Marxist philosophy. Thus I do not believe that we can establish an 
unequivocal and determinate relation between structuralism and philosophy.  
You will tell me that all this is known, that we know all too well that structuralism is not a 
philosophy, but a method. It is exactly here that I would like to make an objection. It does not seem to me, 
finally, that we can really define structuralism as a method. Firstly, it is very difficult to see in what way 
the method of analysis of folktales by Propp can resemble the method of analysis of philosophical 
systems by Guéroult; in what way the analysis of literary genres by Frye in America can resemble the 
analysis of myths by Lévi-Strauss. 
In fact, it seems to me that the word “structuralism” designates much more a set of disciplines, 
perhaps not even disciplines, but preoccupations, a number of analyses which share, at bottom, an object. 
And so paradoxically enough, I would define structuralism, and the different structuralisms, by the 
commonality of their object. I would say that structuralism is currently the set of attempts by which we 
try to analyze what we might call the “documentary mass” [masse documentaire]. That is to say the set of 
signs, traces, or marks that humanity has left behind and that humanity continues, every day and in greater 
and greater numbers, to form around itself. This documentary mass, this mass of traces – signs that are 
thus deposited and sedimented in the history of the world and that are entered into the universal archive 
which is formed and which is always being formed – this documentary mass, of what is it made? Of 
course, it is all the strictly verbal traces, all the written traces. It is, of course, literature. But it is in a 
general way all the other things that it has been possible to write, print, circulate; it is equally all that 
which has been said and which, in one way or another, has been conserved in the memory of men, 
                                                 
3 See for example G. Dumézil, Les dieux des Indo-européens (Paris, 1952); Id., Les dieux des Germains. Essai sur la 
formation de la religion scandinave (Paris, 1959); Id., La religion romaine archaïque (Paris, 1966). 
4  See notably Claude Lévi-Strauss, Mythologiques I. Le cru et le cuit (Paris, 1964); trans. Doreen and John 
Weightman under the title The Raw and the Cooked: An Introduction to a Science of Mythology Vol. 1 (New York, 
1969). See also, Anthropologie structurale (Paris, 1958); trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf 
under the title Structural Anthropology (New York, 1963). 
5 See Roland Barthes, Sur Racine (Paris, 1963); trans. Richard Howard under the title On Racine (New York, 1964). 
6 See notably Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton, N.J., 1957); and A Natural Perspective: 
The Development of Shakespearean Comedy and Romance (New York, 1965). 
7 See Vladimir Propp (1928); trans. Marguerite Derrida, Tzvetan Todorov, and Claude Kahn under the title La 
morphologie du conte (Paris, 1970); trans. Laurence Scott under the title Morphology of the Folktale (Bloomington, 
Ind, 1958); see also Propp (1946) ; trans. Lise Gruel-Apart under the title Les racines historiques du conte 
merveilleux (Paris, 1983) ; partially trans. Ariadna Y. Martin and Richard P. Martin in Theory and History of 
Folklore (Minneapolis, 1984).  
8 Martial Guéroult (1891-1976), professor in the Collège de France from 1951 to 1962, gave his chair the name, 
“History and Technology of Philosophical Systems.” During his life, he devoted systematic studies to, among 
others, Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz, Berkeley, and Fichte. 
memory that is their psychological memory or the material memory of some record. It is likewise all the 
marks that man has been able to leave around himself: works of art, architecture, cities, etc. All of which 
means that the objects that man has made conform not only to the pure and simple laws of production, but 
also to systems which constitute them as marks, and as precisely marks of what man himself has made. 
I believe that what we are in the process of discovering at the moment is the autonomy of that 
aspect by which and under which we can analyze everything that man can make, this aspect not being that 
of the economic production of these objects, of these things, of these signs, of these marks etc., but the 
aspect by which these marks and these signs are consistent with one another as marks, as signs. It is a 
matter of finding the system for determining the document as a document. And we might call this 
discipline of the document as document, drawing on etymology – but I am not very strong [here] –, I 
imagine that we should be able, starting from the Greek verb deiknumi, to find something like deixology 
or whatever, which would be the general discipline of the document as document, and which would be, at 
bottom, what structuralism is currently in the process of constituting. An analysis, then, of the internal 
constraints of the document as such. And it is, I believe, from this point that we can understand the 
apparently flexible character of structuralism. Because in effect, structuralism deals with everything. It 
deals with philosophy; it deals with publicity; it deals with cinema; it deals with psychoanalysis; it deals 
with works of art, etc.  
Secondly, this explains, I believe, the importance that structuralism cannot fail to attach to 
something like linguistics, insofar as linguistics is at the heart, precisely, of all those documents that man 
leaves around himself, for after all, language is the most general form in which the human document in 
general appears.  
Thirdly, this explains, I believe, the conflicts that the method, that the concepts of structuralism, 
that the structural descriptions [provoke]. That is, the conflicts that arise regarding this structural 
description in the disciplines that study the document not specifically as a document, but as something 
that it was possible to produce in a system of the economic type in the broad sense. That is to say that 
faced with everything that has been sedimented in the history of humanity, we can take essentially two 
attitudes: either we can seek the series of processes which have permitted these different objects created 
by humanity to be produced, and this is the search for those laws of production that I would call, broadly 
speaking, economics; or we can try to study the set of remnants – the set of marks that define the objects 
created by humanity – as, and only as, documents. It is this second aspect that characterizes, I believe, 
against economics, against the economic analysis of production, what we could call the deixological 
analysis of those same objects.  
The distinction between these two forms of analysis is perhaps obviously a little delicate to make 
and you understand well why it poses problems. But, after all, we have a model right before our eyes. 
This model is simply what is offered to us by the natural sciences. We know well, for a good thirty years 
now, that the old analysis which was practiced in the nineteenth century, the analysis of energy processes, 
is no longer able to fully account for a number of phenomena – phenomena of the physical order, the 
chemical order, of the biological order above all –, and that it is also necessary to analyze, in addition to 
energy processes, what we call information processes. And at the moment, we can no longer do biology 
without envisaging the perpetual interaction that exists between the energy processes and the information 
processes that make all biological phenomena possible. The definition of the relations between energy 
processes and information processes evidently poses many problems, but the analysis of these relations 
can only be done insofar as we have distinguished the two levels, the energetic level and the informational 
level. 
It seems to me that the problem is more or less the same with regard to “human” phenomena, 
which is to say that the phenomena called human must be analyzed at two levels: at the level of their 
production, which is the economic level; and the level at which they conform to the very laws of the 
document as document, that is to say, the deixological level. And if it is true that it is really going to be 
necessary one day to attempt to study the interference that exists between these two levels – this 
interference which is the very substance, the very object of history – this interference will only be able to 
be defined insofar as we have already properly distinguished the two levels. I believe that the 
methodological importance, the epistemological importance, and the philosophical importance of 
structuralism lies precisely in this. It was initially a method, and there is no doubt that it is as a method 
that it made, as it were, the breakthrough toward this new object, toward this stratum, toward this new 
epistemological domain that I call by the arbitrary word “deixology.” And it is from this methodological 
breakthrough that this new object is in the process of being constituted, and from the moment this new 
object is constituted, inevitably, structuralism can no longer be defined purely and simply as a method. It 
becomes the obligation pure and simple to roam this new domain before us, which is to say that 
structuralism has arrived at the point where it must erase itself and disappear as a method in order to 
recognize, in some way folding back on itself at the moment of its erasure, that what it has done was quite 
simply to discover an object. We could compare the example of structuralism with that of pathological 
anatomy at the end of the eighteenth century. Pathological anatomy at the end of the eighteenth century 
was quite simply a medical method used by a number of doctors and which generated many arguments 
and difficulties. And then, finally, the analysis of pathological anatomy discovered an object which was 
not foreseen: physiology; so that physiology was then developed as an autonomous discipline, using 
pathological anatomy as a particular method.9 This is probably what is going to happen to structuralism.  
This is, roughly, the current situation of structuralism. This is what I wanted to say about this 
general meaning, about the general meaning of this word.  
And what does literary analysis proper have to do with all this? If what I have told you is correct, 
you can see that literary analysis is necessarily part of these disciplines of the document: it is a matter of 
studying in a privileged fashion those documents that we call “literary works.” In fact, literary analysis, 
and structural literary analysis, has always held a bit of a lofty position with regard to the disciplines I am 
speaking to you about and which we have, up to this point, grouped under the name of structuralism. In 
fact, literary analysis joined this domain of the deixological disciplines very early on. Why and how? 
I believe that we may summarize the situation very schematically in the following manner. 
Formerly, the function of literary analysis was essentially to enable communication, to mediate between 
the writing – the work proper – and its consumption, that is, its reading by a public. Literary analysis was 
in fact a sort of ambiguous act, midway between writing and reading, which was supposed to allow a 
number of people to read a text that was written by one person. This mediating function of literary 
analysis can be summed up and described under three headings. On the one hand, the function of literary 
critique, of literary analysis, was to sort those written texts which ought to be read from those which did 
not deserve to be read. That was how literary critique got rid of works like those of Sade or Lautréamont 
once and for all. This was its first role. Its second role was to judge works, to tell a potential reader in 
advance whether a work was worth anything and what it was worth in relation to other works – thus to 
place a work on a hierarchical scale. And thirdly, [literary analysis] had the role of simplifying the work – 
in any case, of simplifying the operation that reading a work entails – and it was to give a sort of schema 
of the production of the work, explaining how the author wrote, why he wrote, what he wanted to do, etc. 
These three functions – sorting, judging, explaining or clarifying – meant that when faced with a written 
work, literary analysis took up the position, as it were, of the ideal reader. And those who did literary 
analysis, practicing this absolute reading – dominating and ideal – wrote a text which was to be a 
mediation for the future reader, which was to authorize, found, and simplify the future reader’s reading of 
the original text. It was therefore this linear structure: a) writing, b) literary analysis, c) reading – it is this 
structure that defined, I believe, the role of what is specifically called critique. For literary analysis was 
critique. That is to say, it was a criticism that sorted out; it was an aesthetic that made judgments; and it 
was at the same time a kind of history of the production of the work, an explication of the reasons why [it 
was produced], a reduction of the work to the reasons why it was produced. This is, roughly, the reason 
why all literary analysis was fundamentally critique. This is also why there was, why there has been in all 
western-type societies that class of curious and formidable personages called literary critics, the invention 
of which – perhaps the sad invention, but never mind – dates back roughly to Sainte-Beuve. 
                                                 
9 See Michel Foucault, Naissance de la clinique (Paris, 1963) ; trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith under the title Birth of 
the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (New York, 1973). 
I believe that over the course of the twentieth century, the position of literary analysis changed. A 
completely different configuration was substituted for the linear schema that I have tried to represent for 
you. I believe that literary analysis has now gotten away from this road, from the writing-consumption 
axis which situated it formerly. And now literary analysis has become a relation no longer of writing to 
reading, but of writing to writing. That is to say, literary analysis is now the possibility of constituting, 
from a given language called “the work,” a new language, a new language such that this second language, 
obtained from the first, can talk about the first. The problem of critique, you see, no longer exists as it did 
formerly, as it was in the nineteenth century: how can and how should readers in general, and the ideal 
reader in particular, judge the work in question? Now the issue of critique is this: what transformation 
must the language of a work undergo so that the language thus transformed speaks about this work and 
expresses something about this work? To the extent that critique, literary analysis has become this [issue], 
you can understand how and why literary analysis, now, is not at all interested in the production of the 
work, in how its birth was possible. Instead, it is going to be interested in the work as document, that is to 
say, as it is made with this form of document called language; that is to say, literary analysis is going to 
concern itself with the work insofar as it is, fundamentally, language. And it is in this way that literary 
analysis is going to become like the analysis of myths, etc, and along with them, a sort of deixology. 
Secondly, this explains why literary analysis, to the extent that it transforms a given language into 
a new language which must speak about [the given language], is now tied, quite closely, to the problem of 
linguistics. This also explains how and why it is tied to the problem of logic, that is to say, to the problem 
which principally concerns the transformation of statements. Finally, you see how and why literary 
analysis – no longer being that mediation between writing and reading – cannot but abandon that old 
function of sorting, critique, and judgment which used to belong to it. From now on, literary analysis will 
suspend all judgment of the work, will suspend every function of sorting for the reader. There will be no 
more sacred works, there will be no more works instantly valorized for literary analysis. The role of the 
critic, that is to say, the role which consisted of sorting and judging works, will no longer be anything but 
the role, as it were, of a road surveyor of literature. In relation to literary analysis, reviews like those we 
read in the newspapers are, so to speak, nothing but a kind of tail, and it is well known that at the very tip 
of this tail the plume of Pierre-Henri Simon is planted.10  
You see as well why and how history – historical analysis insofar as it is the study of the 
production of a work – how this historical analysis can no longer be the essential and primary theme of 
literary analysis. For literary analysis no longer worries about knowing how a work was able to be 
produced, but rather [about knowing] how a work can generate another language in which the work or 
certain of its aspects are manifested, that is to say: the language of analysis. 
This is, I believe, how we might explain the presence, firstly, of this new discipline called 
“literary analysis,” and then, secondly, the proximity of literary analysis to disciplines that are seemingly 
far removed from it, but whose kinship now becomes clear. All these disciplines that deal with the 
document as document, whether it is a purely spoken document as in the case of psychoanalysis, for 
example, or a document of the oral tradition as in the analysis of folktales, or an analysis of documents 
like, for example, the documents that sociology deals with.  
So this is roughly what I wanted to say, fairly schematically, to situate a little the problems of the 
structuralist disciplines and of literary analysis. Now I would like (and this would be the third direction 
for a possible debate) to situate for you a little – but you know it better, you know it better than I – the 
current tendencies of structuralism insofar as it is the form of literary analysis.  
The use of structural concepts in literary analysis poses a small historical problem that it is quite 
curious. As you know, structural analysis in the literary domain was invented a very long time ago, 
                                                 
10 Pierre-Henri Simon (1903-1972) was a literary critic, essayist, and novelist who in 1961 began [writing a literary 
column; commença à tenir le feuilleton littéraire] in the daily Le Monde. Among his works of literary criticism, see 
notably Histoire de la littérature française au XXe siècle. 1900-1950 (Paris, 1956) and Le domaine héroïque des 
lettres françaises. Xe-XIXe siècles (Paris, 1963). 
 
exactly a half century ago, in Russia. Around 1915, the Russian Formalists, who were trained primarily in 
linguistics, began to apply concepts that were already basically structural concepts to literary analysis. 
Then in Prague, in Czechoslovakia, in the U.S.A, and in England, where a certain number of Russian 
Formalists had emigrated – it was there that literary analysis in a structuralist form was developed. And 
finally, just after the war of 1940-1945, we saw this thing that is literary structuralism take shape (in a 
very timid fashion) in France. Yet curiously, in France, structuralism in the literary domain was not 
originally developed from a reflection on what language [langue] is. That is to say that historically, the 
linguistic model played only a very small role, it played practically no role in the formation of the French 
nouvelle critique. In fact, the point at which la nouvelle critique was constituted in France, the point of 
irruption of la nouvelle critique, was, curiously, psychoanalysis – psychoanalysis in the strict sense of the 
term, the “extended” psychoanalysis of Bachelard and the existential psychoanalysis of Sartre. La 
nouvelle critique was constituted from these forms of analysis. And it is plainly afterwards – that is to say 
very recently, less than ten years ago, barely seven or eight years – that literary analysis in France 
discovered the linguistic model and transferred, as it were, the methods of the psychoanalytic 
denomination to the linguistic denomination. The psychoanalytic denomination was of course a relatively 
lax denomination, extremely free in relation to the Freudian letter of the law. Nevertheless it was along 
those lines that structuralism could emerge. It is not at all surprising that the structuralism of la nouvelle 
critique was born out of psychoanalysis, for a very simple reason: it is that insofar as psychoanalysis is 
also, after all, a study of the document, which is to say, a study of the human speech [parole] such as it is 
spoken by someone in a certain well-defined situation and, as you know, insofar as psychoanalysis is 
itself a treatment of the document, it cannot but be structuralist at least in the sense that it is also a 
discipline of the deixological type. Thus it is not surprising that literary analysis in France has come to 
structuralism not via linguistics but via psychoanalysis. This is how we should historically situate the 
birth, I believe, of this nouvelle critique. 
How was it developed and in what direction? I believe that we can say roughly this. The goal of 
everything we call la nouvelle critique is to define with regard to a given text, that is to say, a literary 
work: firstly, the elements according to which one can divide the given work; secondly, the network of 
relations that hold together the elements so defined. You will tell me that all of this is simple, but it poses 
problems. All of this poses problems because the work conforms to a division into chapters, into 
paragraphs, into sentences, into words; this division is not the same as that which must be established by 
the analysis in order to show how and why the work functions. 
The first principle of structuralism in literary analysis is to consider that, contrary to the old 
schema of the nineteenth century, the work is not essentially the product of time; a work does not follow, 
both in its birth and then in its existence, a linear pathway that would be, roughly, a chronological thread. 
The work is recognized as a fragment of space in which all the elements exist simultaneously. This 
simultaneity being granted, the whole work being juxtaposed in this manner, it is from this moment that 
we can divide the work into its elements and establish the functioning that may exist between these 
different elements. In other words, it is not the diachronic thread of the work that must lead us; it is the 
synchrony of the work with regard to itself. This is not to say that we dismiss the fact that the work has 
appeared at a given moment, in a given culture, or with a given individual. But to define how the work 
functions, it is necessary to recognize that it is always synchronic in relation to itself.  
In general, literary analysis up to the present has established the synchrony of the work in relation 
to itself in two ways: firstly, in the dimension of the imaginary, and secondly, in the dimension of 
language. The place in which the work was initially spatialized and rendered contemporaneous with itself 
was the imaginary; and we tried to constitute, and we can say that in general a number of works of literary 
analysis have constituted, a logic or even a geometry of the imaginary. Such was the work of Bachelard at 
first, which constituted a sort of elementary logic of the literary imagination through a number of qualities 
that were opposed to one another – and this independently of the psychology of the author, independently 
of the psychology of the reader as well – the sort of qualities that would exist objectively of themselves, at 
the heart of things, so to speak, and whose system of oppositions would give to the work its possibility 
and its logic. That is a sketch of the logic of the imaginary.11 An experiment in the geometry of the 
imaginary can be found in a work like that of Poulet, for example, where he did a series of analyses of the 
circle in which he showed how the works themselves – in what they narrate and in the law that forms 
them, that forms the different parts and the different elements – conform to geometric figures that are at 
once represented in the work and representatives of the work.12 It is along this line, following Poulet, that 
Starobinski, for example, did a study of Rousseau13 on the theme of obstruction and transparency; and he 
has shown how, in the themes of the entire oeuvre of Rousseau, you find this curious spatial figure with a 
sort of opacity that comes to cover things and to isolate man from things, and then, a search for 
transparency that cannot be achieved, which must in any case be achieved through language as the 
instrument of the “translucidification” of this veil, of this wall, which separates the individual from 
things; and language is what polishes and makes transparent this kind of veil. The work is thus, in its 
themes, animated by that, but at the same time the work is precisely this spatial figure, for it is through his 
work and through that literary work that Rousseau wrote. It is through that work that Rousseau tried in 
effect to make the world transparent, this world that, since his childhood and since the injustice that he 
had been the victim of in his childhood, had become for him absolutely opaque and lost. Thus, the work 
in itself is effectively that species of spatial configuration and dynamics of space that is represented in 
what it says. This is how we could situate a number of analyses which would be analyses of the logic and 
geometry of the imaginary. 
There is a second direction that is much more recent and which is the analysis of the literary work 
based on the linguistic schemas that characterize it. And I believe this analysis was done for the first time 
in France by Lévi-Strauss with regard to a sonnet by Baudelaire, where he showed how the Chats sonnet 
was wholly structured by the phonetic possibilities available to Baudelaire, and he constructed this sonnet 
based on a system of redundancies that he arranged according to the phonetic characters proper to the 
French language.14 This study, which remained little known, quite forgotten for a certain number of years, 
has recently been brought to light again, and currently, the works of Barthes and Genette are entirely 
oriented in this direction, except that the linguistic schemas with which they attempt to define a work, the 
linguistic schemas they use are not those of phonetics, but those of syntax and of semantics. It is 
principally rhetoric, the schemas of rhetoric, that they use as a guiding thread for the analysis of works. 
This assumes, of course, that the literary work itself is nothing other than a kind of redoubling of 
linguistic structures on themselves. This assumes that the literary work is, in a way, language manifesting 
itself in its structure and in its virtuality.  
Finally, there would be a third direction – and I will stop myself because, once more, it is merely 
indications that I must give you. There is a third direction that is currently still more or less unexplored, 
but of which we can ask ourselves if it would not be [allowed].15 You know in effect that the people who 
have reflected on language lately, the linguists on the one hand and the logicians on the other, have 
noticed that when we study statements, there is an element or rather a series of elements that are at least 
as important as la langue, and this is what we call, roughly, the extra-linguistic. Linguists like Prieto and 
logicians like Austin have shown that in fact, the linguistic structure of a statement was far from being 
sufficient to account for its total existence. Prieto in particular has shown how the contextual elements 
                                                 
11 See notably Gaston Bachelard, L’eau et les rêves. Essai sur l’imagination de la matière (Paris, 1942) ; trans. Edith 
R. Farrell under the title Water and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Matter (Dallas, 1983); and L’air et les 
songes. Essai sur l’imagination du muvement (Paris, 1943); trans. Edith R. Farrell and C. Frederick Farrell under the 
title Air and Dreams ; An Essay on the Imagination of Movement (Dallas, 1988). 
12 See Georges Poulet, Les métamorphoses du cercle (Paris, 1961); trans. Carley Dawson and Elliott Coleman in 
collaboration with the author under the title Metamorphoses of the Circle (Baltimore, 1966). 
13  See Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, la transparence et l’obstacle (Paris, 1957); trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer under the title Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Transparency and Obstruction (Chicago, 1988). 
14 See Roman Jakobson and Claude Lévi-Strauss “‘Les Chats’ de Charles Baudelaire,” L’Homme (1962): 5-21; 
trans. F.M. De George in The Structuralists: From Marx to Lévi-Strauss, ed. Richard T. De George and Fernande M. 
de George (New York, 1972). 
15 Conjecture; inaudible word. 
constituted by the very situation of the individual speaking are absolutely necessary to give meaning to a 
number of statements and, indeed, to a large number of statements.16 In fact, every statement silently 
relies on a certain objective and real situation, and the statement would certainly not have the form it has 
if the context were different. The first (princeps) example that Prieto takes up is this: when you have a red 
notebook on a table and you want to ask someone to pick up that notebook, you say to him, “pick it up” 
or “pick up the notebook”; when there are two notebooks, one red and one green, you ask your 
interlocutor to pick up one of the notebooks by saying, “pick up the red one” or “pick up the one on the 
right.” You see that these two statements, which have exactly the same meaning (an order from A 
addressed to B to pick up the notebook on the table), this same meaning gives rise to two statements that 
are entirely different depending on whether the objective context is the first or the second. In 
consequence, the definition of a statement, the choice of the form of a statement is possible only as a 
function of this context. 
On the other hand, and now I am moving to the research of the logicians, someone like Austin has 
shown that the statements themselves cannot be analyzed independently of the speech act, which is 
actually performed by the speaker at the moment when he speaks.17 For example, when someone says 
“the session is called to order,” this phrase is not at all constative. Indeed, the session is not open, it does 
not constate that the session is open; it does not give an order either, for the session does not obey and it 
does not open on its own because it was ordered to. What is this statement? It is a statement that is 
grammatically identical to a constative and which is nevertheless neither a constative nor an affirmation. 
It is something that Austin calls a performative. Little matter what he calls it. You see that, based on this 
simple example, the description of a statement is in no way complete simply once we have defined the 
linguistic structure of that statement. 
You see from these two examples – which are simply points of reference – that within the studies 
of language, we are in the process of realizing that the analysis of discourse can no longer be done solely 
in linguistic terms. Discourse is not simply a particular case within language. Discourse is not a manner of 
combining elements together according to the linguistic rules that are given by the language itself. 
Discourse is something that necessarily overflows the language. We could thus ask ourselves if literary 
analysis – that is to say, the analysis of that special discourse which is a literary work – should not take 
into consideration all the extra-linguistic elements that we are now in the process of discovering in the 
analysis of language. And, in general, I see that there will be [two]18 directions in which we could go. 
Firstly, we could try to define, somewhat in line with what Prieto described, what is actually said 
in statements of literature. Indeed, when you open a novel, there is no context to this novel. When, for 
example, Joyce, beginning Ulysses,19 says – unfortunately the name of the character escapes me –: 
“Descend the staircase,”20 the staircase, which is designated by a definite article, is not next to you. It is 
not like when you say, when I say, for example, “the glass.” When I say “the glass,” you know perfectly 
well that it is this glass. When Joyce in his novel says “the staircase,” nobody knows what this staircase 
is; there is no real context. And yet, Joyce does not say all, he does not explain exactly what the context 
should be that we should put in place in order to fill, as it were, this empty indication given by the definite 
article. It is the work itself that divides, in some way, in a non-existent context, what must appear and 
what does not need to appear. It is sufficient to compare, for example, a description of Balzac’s and a 
description of Robbe-Grillet’s to see exactly how, in certain works of the Balzacian type, there are a 
number of things that absolutely must be said and which are in some sense the context. The extra-
linguistic is presented in the work itself: the date of the event, the city where it is located, the name of the 
                                                 
16 See Luis J. Prieto, Messages et signaux (Paris, 1966). 
17 See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words (Oxford, 1962); trans. G. Lane under the title Quand dire, c’est 
faire (Paris, 1970). 
18 Foucault says “trois.” 
19
 James Joyce, Ulysses (Paris, 1922); trans. Auguste Morel under the title Ulysse (Paris, 1929).  
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 The English text says, “Halted, he [Buck Mulligan] peered down the dark winding stairs and called out coarsely: 
“Come up, Kinch! Come up, you fearful jesuit!” 
character, his ancestors, what has happened to him, his past, etc. And if you take a novel by Robbe-
Grillet, when Robbe-Grillet begins Labyrinth21 by saying: “Here,” you will never know what this “here” 
is – if it is a city, which city it is, in what country it is located, if it is an apartment, if it is a picture, if it is 
a real space, if it is an imaginary space, etc. You see therefore that the way in which the extra-linguistic is 
manifested in the statements of the literary work is very different from one epoch to another and from one 
writer to another. And we could, in the vein of the linguistic analyses of Prieto, study the role of the 
extralinguistic context within the work itself. 
Secondly, we could also study a bit in the line of what the logicians, Austin in particular, have 
done. [We could] study the way in which statements are somehow posed in the very text of the literary 
work: what is the act that is actually performed in a given sentence? And it is clear that in a description, in 
a reported dialogue, in a reflection by the author on his own character, in a psychological notation […] 
you see there is an entire formal analysis of the work, but one which would be done in a way that is not at 
all the way of linguistics. [It would be]22 a structural study of what is extralinguistic in the linguistic 
statements of the work itself. 
I have simply pointed out these possible directions of work to show you essentially how 
structuralism, far from being bound to some doctrinal position, far from being bound to a precise and 
definitively realised method, is, in fact, much more a domain of research, a domain of research which 
opens up probably in a rather undefined way. In any case, so long as we have not yet scoured the 
ensemble of this documentary mass that humanity has deposited around itself, of which literature is a part, 
so long as we have not used all possible methods to show what this document as document is, 
structuralism, if it is true that structuralism is simply the science of the document, you see that 
structuralism will have a good life. In any event, we should absolutely not identify structuralism either 
with a philosophy or even with a particular method. 
These are, very roughly, the indications that I wanted to give you and this – unfortunately I have 
gone a little long – to quite simply introduce the questions, objections that you would like to make. 
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